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Abstract 
The analysis of risks associated with communications, and information security for a system-of-systems is a challenging 
endeavor. This difficulty is due to the complex interdependencies that exist in the communication and operational dimensions of 
the system-of-systems network, where disruptions on nodes and links can give rise to cascading failure modes. In this paper, we 
propose the modification of a functional dependency analysis tool, as a means of analyzing system-of-system operational and 
communication architectures. The goal of this research is to quantify the impact of attacks on communications, and information 
flows on the operability of the component systems, and to evaluate and compare different architectures with respect to their 
reliability and robustness under attack. Based on the topology of the network, and on the properties of the dependencies, our 
method quantifies the operability of each system as a function of the availability and correctness of the required input, and of the 
operability of the other systems in the network. The model accounts for partial capabilities and partial degradation. Robustness of 
the system-of-systems is evaluated in terms of its capability to maintain an adequate level of operability following a disruption in 
communications. Hence, different architectures can be compared based on their sensitivity to attacks, and the method can be used 
to guide decision both in architecting the system-of-systems and in planning updates and modifications, accounting for the 
impact of interdependencies on the robustness of the system-of-systems. Synthetic examples show conceptual application of the 
method.  
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1. Introduction 
The disruption of communications and data flows has become an increasingly important factor in attacks and 
warfare scenarios. Modern communication systems and infrastructure are increasingly reliant on advances in 
cybersecurity, a discipline of increasing prominence, that requires specific research and development1,2. In 
cybersecurity, we can define cyberspace as the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures, 
and includes the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and 
controllers in critical industries. Common usage of the term also refers to the virtual environment of information and 
interactions3. Thus, cybersecurity involves the protection and defence of technologic resources, data, and 
communications.  
The strategy to increase cybersecurity is twofold: cyberattacks can be reduced or contained (thus making the 
attacks unsuccessful), or the impacts of successful cyberattacks can be reduced, by improving the resilience of 
systems to such attacks. One fundamental requirement to achieve the latter step is risk evaluation and impact 
assessment4. This evaluation must also account for the possible cascading effects that cyberattacks can have on the 
operability of a system5. Powell6 gives a classification of the cascading effects, following the primary (direct) 
effects: secondary cascading effects, also called internal, affect distributed service within the system that is primarily 
distressed by the cyberattack. Tertiary cascading effects, also called external, result in the loss or degradation of 
operational or mission capabilities external, but dependent on the primarily affected system. This study focuses on 
systems-of-systems, in which the tertiary effects play a fundamental role, due to the importance of the 
interdependencies between the constituent systems.  
System-of-systems are complex aggregate of systems where the constituent entities have, at least in part, 
operational and managerial independence7,8. The behavior of the overall System-of-Systems depends not only on 
that of the single systems, but also on the interactions between the constituent systems9,10. Degradation occurring in 
systems due to an attack may not critically damage the system itself. Instead, it may cause the emergence of critical 
loss of operability elsewhere in the interconnected system-of-systems11,12. For this reasons, the behavior of a system-
of-systems, when a component systems is subject to a cyberattack, can be very different from the behavior of the 
system under attack, in terms of robustness and reliability.  
The consequences of attacks on the system-of-systems cannot be understood by means of the merely evaluation 
of the behavior of the single systems, but require an assessment of the effect of the interdependencies on the 
behavior of the whole system-of-systems. For this reason, we propose to modify a tool, used for functional 
dependency analysis in systems-of-systems, to tailor it to cyberattacks impact assessment. We model the systems-of-
systems as a network, where nodes represent the component systems and the capabilities that the system-of-systems 
is meant to achieve, and edges represent the operational dependencies, and the information flow. Each dependency 
is characterized by strength, that quantifies how much the behavior of a system depends on the behavior of another 
system, and criticality, that quantifies the negative impact that a system has on another, in critical conditions. Given 
a specific architecture, the method ranks nodes and links based on the criticality of their impact on the operability of 
the system-of-systems in case of attacks, accounting for partial degradation and cascading effects. Our research adds 
to the analysis of the behavior of individual systems, an evaluation of how interdependencies affect the behavior of 
the system-of-systems when attacks occur. The tool detects both positive and negative effects of the 
interdependencies, which can be used to guide decision about actions to undertake in order to improve the 
robustness of the system-of-systems. 
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2. Communication and Functional Dependency Network Analysis 
2.1. Basics of Functional Dependency Network Analysis 
 Functional Dependency Network Analysis (FDNA) was originally formulated by Garvey and Pinto13,14, who 
applied it to capability portfolio analysis and risk assessment. We modified FDNA modified to make it suitable to 
analyze interdependencies in SoS15, and we successfully applied it to aerospace SoS16,17. In this section, we 
summarize the basic ideas and formulation of FDNA (for a complete description of the method, and its applications 
in other fields, cf. [15], [16], and [17]), while in the next we describe the modifications introduced on the method, in 
order to tailor it to the analysis of cyberattacks. 
In FDNA, the architecture of SoS is modeled as a directed network (Fig. 1). The nodes represent either the 
component systems or the capability that the SoS is meant to acquire. Accordingly, the links represent the 
operational dependencies between the systems or between the capabilities. Each dependency is characterized by 
strength (Strength of Dependency, SOD) and criticality (Criticality of Dependency, COD), that affect the behavior 
of the whole SoS in different ways. Strength of dependency accounts for how much the behavior of a system is 
affected by the behavior of a predecessor system, while criticality of dependency quantifies how the functionality of 
a system is degraded when a predecessor system is experiencing a major failure. Those inputs can come from expert 
judgment and evaluation, or may be the result of simulation and experiments. 
 
Fig. 1. Synthetic FDNA network. N: node. SOD: strength of dependency. COD: criticality of dependency. SE: self-effectiveness. 
We use this method to evaluate the effect of topology, and of possible degraded functioning of one or more 
systems on the operability of each system in the network. The analysis can be a deterministic evaluation of a single 
instance of the SoS, or a stochastic quantification of the overall SoS behavior. In the deterministic analysis, given 
the internal health status (called Self-Effectiveness, SE) of each system, and the properties of the dependencies, 
FDNA quantifies the operability Oi of each system, based on equations (1) – (6). The operability of a node, ranging 
between 0 and 100, is defined as the “percentage” of effectiveness, that is the level at which the system is currently 
operating, or the level at which the desired capability is being currently achieved.  
The operability of root nodes is equal to their self-effectiveness, since they are not dependent from other 
nodes: 
௜ܱ ൌ ܵܧ௜  (1) 
 
The operability of nodes that have at least one predecessor is computed as the minimum of two terms, one 
depending on the SODs, and one depending on the CODs: 
௝ܱ ൌ ݉݅݊ሺܱܵܦ̴ ௝ܱǡ ܥܱܦ̴ ௝ܱሻ  (2) 
ܱܵܦ̴ ௝ܱ ൌ ଵ௡ σ ܱܵܦ̴ ௝ܱ௜௡௜ୀଵ   (3) 
ܱܵܦ̴ ௝ܱ௜ ൌ ܱܵܦ௜௝ ௜ܱ ൅ ሺͳ െ ܱܵܦ௜௝ሻܵܧ௝  (4) 
N1 
N3 
Predecessors Successor 
N2 
SE1 
SE2 
SE3 
SOD13, COD13 
SOD23, COD23 
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ܥܱܦ̴ ௝ܱ ൌ ݉݅݊ሺܥܱܦ̴ ௝ܱଵǡ ܥܱܦ̴ ௝ܱଶǡ ǥ ǡ ܥܱܦ̴ ௝ܱ௡ሻ (5) 
ܥܱܦ̴ ௝ܱ௜ ൌ ௜ܱ ൅ ܥܱܦ௜௝   (6) 
 
In the stochastic version of FDNA, the self-effectiveness of each system follows a probability distribution; this 
means that the resulting operability of the nodes is probabilistic. In the previous studies15, we proposed FDNA as a 
tool to identify the most critical nodes in the network, as well as the most important dependencies, in terms of 
impact on the operability when disruptions occur. The robustness of a SoS can be evaluated as the ability to reduce 
the loss of operability when partial failures affect one or more systems. 
2.2. Evaluating the impact of cyberattacks 
Based on the features of cyberattacks impact, FDNA has been modified to account for internal (primary and 
secondary) and external (tertiary) effects. While the concept of self-effectiveness already models the internal effects 
(Fig. 2b), as well as disruptions on the operability of a system, we added a weight on each link, called Availability 
of Data (AOD). This value models the effect of specific communication and data loss on a single interdependency 
(Fig. 2c). This representation can also model multiple communication means. AOD can also represent partially 
compromised communication and data. In this case, expert judgment or simulation data can be used to generate the 
value of AOD that models the specific impact of the loss on the specific interdependency. Fig. 2 shows possible 
situations when cyberattacks internally affect a system, causing both primary/secondary and tertiary effects, and 
when cyberattacks affect communication links, causing tertiary effects on a subset of the systems dependent on the 
attacked system. 
 
Fig. 2. Synthetic FDNA network. (a) Correct working: the predecessor system has 100% operability, dependent systems “see” 100%, and this 
value, combined with their self-effectiveness, constitutes an input to FDNA, to compute the operability of the dependent systems. (b) Internal 
cyberattack on a system: the internal operability decreases, externally affecting all the dependent systems. (c) Cyberattack on a communication 
link: the operability of the predecessor is not degraded, but one of the dependent systems receives a disrupted input. 
In the modified version of FDNA, we change equations (4) and (6) as follows, to account for the availability of 
data: 
 
ܱܵܦ̴ ௝ܱ௜ ൌ ܣܱܦ௜௝ܱܵܦ௜௝ ௜ܱ ൅ ሺͳ െ ܱܵܦ௜௝ሻܵܧ௝  (4b) 
ܥܱܦ̴ ௝ܱ௜ ൌ ܣܱܦ௜௝ ௜ܱ ൅ ܥܱܦ௜௝   (6b) 
3. Results 
3.1. Five-node aerospace network 
O=100% 
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Preliminary results have been obtained from the analysis of an aerospace system-of-systems (Fig. 3), comprised 
of five systems: a ground station, two satellites, a UAV, and a carrier. The edges in the network represent data 
communication.  
Fig. 3. (a) Five-node aerospace system-of-systems. (b) FDNA representation of the five-node aerospace system-of-systems. The two numbers in 
each bracket are respectively the SOD and COD of each interdependency. 
Previous results15 identified the ground station N1, and the satellite N4 as the most critical systems for the overall 
operability, when disruptions or internal cyberattacks occur. In most system-of-systems scenarios, however, the 
systems have better internal protection than communication links against attacks. The modified version of FDNA 
performs analysis of cyberattacks on the communication links. Table 1 reports the results of this analysis, where we 
assume that one communication link is disrupted by cyberattack so that the successor receives a reduced amount of 
data, corresponding to an operability of 25% (AOD=0.25) of the predecessor. The links are numbered as in Fig. 3.  
Table 1. Analysis of cyberattacks on the communication links of the five-node aerospace SoS. 
Disrupted link (successor receives 
25% operability) 
Variation in the operability of the 
carrier 
1 -2.39% 
2 -19.13% 
3 -14.81% 
4 -17% 
5 -17% 
6 -45% 
7 -55% 
 
Given the criticality of node N1 and N4, we would expect links 1, 2, 3, 5, and 7 to be the most critical. Instead, 
results show that links 6 and 7 are the most critical with respect to the cascading effect on the operability of the 
carrier, in case of cyberattacks. While an internal disruption or attack on the ground station (N1) would result 
critical15, the architecture of the network makes the station not critical for what concerns the communication links. 
Conversely, while an internal disruption on the UAV system is partially absorbed thanks to the interdependencies on 
other systems, the communication link between the UAV and the carrier is highly critical. Satellite N4 is critical 
both in case of internal attack and in case of attack on the communication link to the carrier. 
The method presented in this paper can also analyze multiple attacks, as well as the effects of cyberattacks on 
communication links that occur simultaneously with other disruptions or internal attacks. Table 2 shows the result of 
attacks on the links in a scenario where the ground station is working with reduced operability. The cascading effect 
of attacks on links 2 and 3 is more than doubled. 
(0.7, 30) 
(0.45, 55) 
(0.75, 20) 
(0.85, 30) 
(0.5, 35) 
(0.45, 35) 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.45, 55) 
N1 
N2 
N3 
N5 
SE4 
SE1 
SE2 
SE3 SE5 
N4 
(a) (b) 
1 2 
3 
4 
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Table 2. Analysis of cyberattacks on the communication links of the five-node aerospace SoS when the ground station is 
experiencing internal disruptions or attacks. 
Disrupted link (successor receives 
25% operability). Self-effectiveness 
of the ground facility is 25% 
Variation in the operability of 
the carrier 
2 -39.75% 
3 -34.95% 
6 -56.25% 
7 -63.44% 
3.2. Littoral combat warfare system-of-systems 
We performed analysis of the impact of cyberattacks on a littoral combat warfare system-of-systems. Fig. 4 
shows the SoS as modeled in an Agent Based Model that we are currently using as a test bed for FDNA. 
Fig. 4. Littoral combat warfare system-of-systems. Each friend agent performs different functions, as shown in the figure. Links are 
communication and data dependencies. 
The network must be converted into a functional dependency analysis network, to be analyzed with the FDNA 
tool. In the modeled scenario, the enemy units consist of five boats, five mines, and one submarine. The objective of 
the SoS is to detect and engage the enemies. Based on the functional dependency, we converted the network as 
shown in Fig. 5. Some agents can perform both reconnaissance and attacks. We split these agents into appropriate 
subsystems, in order to perform FDNA analysis. 
The resulting FDNA network has 35 nodes, 60 operational dependencies, and 12 communication links. In table 3, 
we report the result of the analysis with the modified FDNA tool. The table shows the impact of cyberattacks on 
specific links, one for each subsystem of the Littoral combat warfare SoS. As in the example of the five-node 
aerospace networks, these results give insight into the criticality of systems and communication links in case of 
cyberattacks, constitute a valuable basis for design, architecture, and update decisions, and suggest where to 
leverage more robustness and protection from cyberattacks. 
Results show that a cyberattack on the communication link between the UAV and the ship in the Surface 
subsystem, while affecting the ship, has a minor effect on the efficacy of the surface subsystem, due to its 
architecture. The link to the helicopter in the anti-submarine subsystems is instead critical. 
Surface subsystem Anti-submarine subsystem Anti-mines subsystem 
Attack boat 
90% Recon Sub 
10% Attack boat 
90% Recon mine 
10% Attack boat 
Recon Recon Recon 
Recon 
Recon 
Recon 
Attack Attack 
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Fig. 5. (a) Functional dependency for the littoral combat warfare SoS. (b) Communication links for the littoral combat warfare SoS. Numbered 
links are analyzed in this study. 
 
Table 3. Analysis of cyberattacks on the communication links of the littoral combat warfare SoS. 
Disrupted link 
(successor receives 
25% operability). 
Directly affected system 
Variation in the 
operability of the 
directly affected 
system 
Variation in the 
engaging capability of 
the corresponding 
subsystem 
1 Surface subsystem ship -35% -8.75% 
2 Anti-mine MH60 -15% -15% 
3 Anti-submarine MH60 -45% -45% 
 
These results suggest to modify the architecture in order to support the anti-submarine subsystem. For example, if 
communication is available between the ship in the anti-mine subsystem and the helicopter in the anti-mine 
subsystem, the impact of cyberattacks on link 3 changes with respect to the results in table 3. The loss in the 
engaging capability of the anti-submarine subsystem is only 25%, instead than 45%, when the same cyberattack on 
link 3 as that reported in table 3 occurs. 
This preliminary result shows how the modified FDNA tool can be used to guide effective decision in contrasting 
cyberattacks, when the cascading effect of the interdependencies in a SoS, and the tertiary effects of cyberattacks are 
taken into account. 
4. Conclusions and future work 
We propose a modified functional dependency analysis tool as a means of analyzing the impact of cyberattacks 
on a system-of-systems. Evaluation of risks is a fundamental step in cybersecurity, and a system-of-systems 
representation of interdependent systems is suitable to model the tertiary effects of cyberattacks, i.e. the external 
impact that a cyberattack suffered by a system has on the other systems. Thus, we can extend the analysis of 
cyberattacks on individual systems to include a more complete evaluation of the consequences of such attacks in 
complex networks, where the results of an attack are highly affected by the architecture of the network. 
(b) 
(a) 
Legend 
1 2 3 
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The modified FDNA tool models the direct effects and the cascading effect of disruptions of a system on its 
operability, as well as the effects of cyberattacks on communication links between systems. Preliminary results 
show that the method identifies the critical systems and the critical links with respect to their impact on the overall 
behavior, when cyberattacks occur. We also reported combined effects of internal disruptions and cyberattacks on 
communication links. The analysis of a littoral combat warfare SoS gives insight into possible modifications in the 
architecture, in order to mitigate the consequences of cyberattacks. Interpretation of the analysis of the impact of 
cyberattacks through FNDA results in guidelines for decisions on architecture and updates of a system-of-systems, 
in order to improve its resilience to cyberattacks. 
Future improvement of this research will address two main points: first, we intend to refine the meaning of the 
inputs to the method (SOD, COD, AOD), both as the result of expert judgment, and using simulations and agent 
based models as test bed. Second, we propose to identify and formalize the steps and modifications to be applied to 
a given network, in order to increase its robustness and resilience to cyberattacks. 
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